Herbert Alexander Simon (June 15, 1916 – February 9, 2001) was a researcher in the fields of cognitive psychology, computer science, public administration, economics and philosophy (sometimes described as a polymath).
He was awarded the ACM's A.M. Turing Award along with Allen Newell in 1975 for making "basic contributions to artificial intelligence, the psychology of human cognition, and list processing." In 1978 he was awarded Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics "for his pioneering research into the decision-making process within economic organizations". He coined the terms bounded rationality and satisficing.
He was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1916. He received his B.S. in 1936 from the University of Chicago, where he was a member of the debate team. He earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 1942 with his dissertation in public administration. His dissertation was published as Administrative Behavior, the book upon which his pioneering concepts and his Nobel Prize were based. He held positions at Berkeley and the Illinois Institute of Technology. Simon served on the faculty of Carnegie Mellon University from 1949 until his death, pioneering the quantitative modeling of human behavior through research in a variety of fields.
Simon was a pioneer in the field of artificial intelligence, creating with Allen Newell the Logic Theory Machine (1956) and the General Problem Solver (GPS) (1957) programs. GPS was possibly the first method of separating problem solving strategy from information about particular problems. Both programs were developed using the Information Processing Language(IPL) (1956) developed by Newell, Cliff Shaw and Simon. Donald Knuth mentions (in Volume 1 of The Art of Computer Programming) the development of list processing in IPL with the linked list originally called "NSS memory" for its inventors.
With Allen Newell, Simon developed a theory for the simulation of human problem solving behavior using production rules (Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon, Human Problem Solving, 1972). The study of human problem solving required new kinds of human measurements and he, Allen Newell, and colleagues helped to develop the experimental technique of verbal protocol analysis (K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data, 1993). Simon was interested in the role of knowledge in expertise. He said to become an expert required about 10 years of experience and he and colleagues estimated that expertise was the result of learning roughly 50,000 chunks of information. A chess expert was said to have learned about 50,000 chunks or chess position patterns. (Chase and Simon. Perception in Chess. Cognitive Psychology Volume 4, 1973.)
He was awarded the ACM's A.M. Turing Award along with Allen Newell in 1975 for "In joint scientific efforts extending over twenty years, initially in collaboration with J. C. (Cliff) Shaw at the RAND Corporation, and subsequentially with numerous faculty and student colleagues at Carnegie Mellon University, they have made basic contributions to artificial intelligence, the psychology of human cognition, and list processing."
While living in Pittsburgh, PA, he advised the citizenry on various issues including the use of public funds to build stadiums and the method of raising tax revenue. Simon emphasized the usefulness of the land tax, reflecting the early influence of Henry George on his economic thought.
DECISIONS
Administrative Behavior1was Herbert Simon’s doctoral dissertation and his first book. It served as the foundation for his lifetime of work. The centerpiece of this book is the behavioral and cognitive processes of making rational human choices, that is, decisions. An operational administrative decision should be correct and efficient, and it must be practical to implement with a set of coordinated means.
Any decision involves a choice selected from a number of alternatives, directed toward an organizational goal or subgoal. Realistic options will have real consequences consisting of personnel actions or non-actions modified by environmental facts and values. In actual practice, some of the alternatives may be conscious or unconscious; some of the consequences may be unintended as well as intended; some of the means and ends may be imperfectly differentiated,incompletely related,or poorly detailed.
The task of rational decision making is to select the alternative that results in the more preferred set of all the possible consequences. This task can be divided into three required steps:(1)the identification and listing of all the alternatives; (2)the determination of all the consequences resulting from each of the alternatives; and(3)the comparison of the accuracy and efficiency of each of these sets of consequences.2Any given individual or organization attempting to implement this model in a real situation would be unable to comply with the three requirements.To have the knowledge of all the alternatives,or of all the consequences to follow each alternative is a highly improbable situation. Even much less likely will be the capacity to make an evaluation of all the consequences.
The terrifying question that presents itself at this point is : Given the inevitable limits on rational decision making,what other techniques or behavioral processes can a man,woman,group or organization bring to bear to achieve the approximately best result? Simon writes:“The human being striving for rationality and restricted within the limits of his knowledge has developed some working procedures that partially overcome these difficulties. These procedures consist in assuming that he can isolate from the rest of the world a closed system containing a limited number of variables and a limited range of consequences.”3
Administrative Behavior, as a text, addresses a wide range of human behaviors, cognitive abilities, management techniques, personnel policies, training goals and procedures, specialized roles, criteria for evaluation of accuracy and efficiency, and,of course, all of the ramifications of communication processes. Simon is particularly interested in how these factors directly and indirectly influence the making of decisions.
Weaving in and out of the practical functioning of all of these organizational factors are two universal elements of human social behavior that Simon addresses in Chapter VII—The Role of Authority4, and in Chapter X—Loyalities, and Organizational Identification.5
Authority is a well studied, primary mark of organizational behavior, and is straightforwardly defined in the organizational context as the ability and right of an individual of higher rank to determine the decision of an individual of lower rank. The actions, attitudes, and relationships of the dominant and subordinate individuals constitute components of role behavior that can vary widely in form,style,and content,but do not vary in the expectation of obedience by the one of superior status, and willingness to obey from the suborninate. Authority is highly influential on the formal structure of the organization, including patterns of communication, sanctions,and rewards as well as on establishing the goals, objectives , and values of the organization.
Decisions can be complex admixtures of facts and values. Information about facts, especially empirically proven facts,or facts derived from specialized experience are more easily transmitted in the exercise of authority than are the expressions of values.Simon is primarily interested in seeking identification of the individual employee with the organizational goals and values. Following Lasswell6 he states that “a person identifies himself with a group when, in making a decision, he evaluates the several alternatives of choice in terms of their consequences for the specified group”7. A person may identify himself, or herself with any number of social, geographic, economic, racial, religious, familial, educational, gender, political, and sports groups. Indeed, the number and variety are unlimited, and ubiquitous. The fundamental problem for organizations is to recognize that personal and group identifications can either facilitate or obstruct correct decision making for the organization. A specific organization has to deliberately determine and specify in appropriate detail and clear language its own goals, objectives, means, ends, and values. It is further desired that these important factors be internalized in the psychology of the individual participants.
Chester Bernard is cited as responsible for pointing out that “the decisions that an individual makes as a member of an organization are quite distinct from his personal decisions”8. Personal choices may determine whether an individual joins a particular organization, and continue to be made in his or her extra–organizational private life. But,as a member of an organization, that individual makes decisions not in relationship to personal needs and results, but in an impersonal sense as part of the organizational intent, purpose, and effect. Organizational inducements, rewards, and sanctions are all designed to form, strengthen, and maintain this identification.
The correctness of decisions are measured by two major criteria:1.adequacy of achieving the desired objective; and 2.the efficiency with which the result was obtained. Many members of the organization may focus on adequacy,but the overall administrative management must pay particular attention to the efficiency with which the desired result was abtained with the utilization or expenditure of minimum resources.
NOTES
- 1.Simon, Herbert,Administrative Behavior, The Free Press, New York. 1976, 3rd. ed. 364pp
- 2.Simon, op.cit.p 67
- 3.Simon, op.cit.p.82
- 4.Simon, op.cit.p.123-153
- 5.Simon, op.cit.p.198-216
- 6.Lasswell, H.D., World Politics and Personal Insecurity New York:Whittlesey House,1935 pp.29-51,cited by Simon,in op.cit.p.205
- 7.Simon,in op.cit.p205
- 8.Barnard,C.I, The Functions of the Executive CambridgeHarvard University Press,1938 p77, cited by Simon in op.cit. p202-203
Interesting quotes
- Most producers are employees, not owners of the firms..... Viewed from the vantage point of classical [economic] theory, they have no reason to maximize the profits of the firms, except to the extent that they can be controlled by owners.... Moreover, there is no difference, in this respect, among profit-making firms, non-profit organizations, and bureaucratic organizations. All have exactly the same problem of inducing their employees to work toward the organizational goals. There is no reason, a priori, why it should be easier (or harder) to produce this motivation in organizations aimed at maximizing profits than in organizations with different goals. The conclusion that organization motivated by profits will be more efficient than other organizations does not follow the organizational economy from the neo-classical assumptions. If it is empirically true, other axioms will have to be introduced to account for it.
- "What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention, and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it." (Computers, Communications and the Public Interest, pages 40-41, Martin Greenberger, ed., The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.)
Selected bibliography
- Administrative Behavior 1947
- Models of Man 1957
- Organizations 1959
- Models of Discovery 1977
- Models of Thought 1979, 1989
- Models of Bounded Rationality 1982
- Models of My Life 1991
- The Sciences of the Artificial (3rd Edition) 1996
Reference
H. Simon, "Organizations and markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, no. 2 (1991), p. 28.
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