Objective factors

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This article is about philosophical aspects of objectivity. For use in other fields see objectivity and objectivity (disambiguation)

Objectivity has various meanings in philosophy, and is surely one of the most important philosophical problems, since it concerns the epistemological status of knowledge, the problem of an objective reality and the question of our subjective relationship to other objects in the world.

1 Platonic epistemology
2 Subjective knowledge
3 Propositions and propositional acts
- 3.1 Criticisms
- 3.2 Conclusion
4 Objectivism
- 4.1 The relationship of probability and objectivism
5 Endnotes
6 See also
7 External links
8 Further reading

Platonic epistemology

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On one hand, objectivity may define the status of knowledge, as opposed to subjective knowledge. In this common usage, (scientifical) knowledge is considered to be objective, while personal opinions are said to be subjective. The paradigm of this definition of objectivity can be found in the Platonic epistemology, which takes as model mathematics. Plato was famous for considering knowledge of geometry as a condition of philosophical apprenticeship, both being concerned by universal truths. Thus, Plato's opposition between objective knowledge and doxa (Greek word for "opinions") would become the basis for later philosophies intent on grappling the problem of reality, knowledge and human existence. Episteme is the Greek word for knowledge, and may explain why, according to Plato, there can be only scientific or philosophical knowledge, but no "subjective knowledge". Personal opinions are simply, in Plato's mind, irrelevant, since they belong to the changing sphere of the sensible, opposed to the fixed and eternal sphere of intelligibility. Henceforth, Plato's conception is often the core of the modern ideology of science, which considers only scientific knowledge to be legitimate and disqualify common, layman knowledge as ideological. However, various philosophies of science disagree with this Platonic epistemology, claiming its constitutive dualism is too simple, or insisting in other ways of achieving objectivity, for example by intersubjectivity (i.e. by the way of a consensus reached by the scientific community through dialogue; cf. for example Jürgen Habermas).

Subjective knowledge

The expression "subjective knowledge" may refer to false claims of knowledge, as in Plato's critique of the doxa. However, critics have argued against the political implications of such an epistemology, claiming it legitimates technocracy if not scientism or positivism. Indeed, several authors have pointed out that such a conception, deeply embedded in Occidental ethnocentrism, is not only anti-democratic, but also intellectually insufficient. Famous ethnologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, for example, demonstrated in The Savage Mind (1962) that "primitive" knowledge was just as valid and objective as scientifical knowledge. Michel de Certeau would also argues in favour of a type of arts and crafts empirical knowledge; a position shared by Harold Garfinkel's "ethnomethodology", which focuses on the ways in which people already understand the world and how they use that understanding. The Greek metis (which can be roughly translated as "ruse") has also been defended by some authors as a practical form of intelligence and knowledge, opposed to scientifical knowledge ^[1].

In another, weaker sense, "subjective knowledge" refers to introspective knowledge. Objective knowledge than is knowledge of objects, including others subjects, while subjective knowledge would be knowledge of oneself. This meaning of objectivity refers to the supposed division of the world into subjects and objects, and poses the problem of consciousness.

Propositions and propositional acts

Main article: Proposition

Objectivity is also considered as the compatibility of propositions distinct and independent of propositional attitudes or acts. A proposition is an objective constituent the meaning of which is the same as the object being named by it, and is either true or false.

If truth is considered to be universal (valid in all times and places) and not simply relative as in relativism, it requires that the content of several judgments, or propositional acts, be identical. This assures that:

What is judged in different acts and attitudes is identical. If there is no objective constituent common to and independent of different judgments, communication and science would not be possible.
A person or persons may think the same thought at different times and with different attitudes. Consistent belief systems and identity over time requires that there be propositions independent of propositional acts.
Independent propositions are required in order to account for the incompatibility between different propositional acts. If I state that "Plato was a Greek" and you state that "Plato was not a Greek", the objective constituent must be a content independent of our propositional acts.

The objective and universal nature of truth requires that there be temporally neutral propositions independent of propositional acts. Whether or not there are propositions is one of the most disputed questions of philosophy. The position that there are propositions which are timeless truths independent of our propositional acts, and which are not the products of or dependent upon our propositional acts, must be distinguished from conceptualism or relativism.

"Objectivity" as a term has become quite specific and technical within the discipline, and should not be confused with a particular philosopher's criteria for "objective knowledge" or different notions of objectivism within the several branches of philosophy. Notions of objectivism tend to state that there is a reality or realm of objects existing independent of the mind, e.g. metaphysical objectivism. Objectivism then is inclusive of objects which we may not know about and are not the intended objects of mental acts. Objectivity requires truth, and the objects themselves are not true or false. Only propositions, or the objective constituents of our propositional acts, are true or false

Criticisms

The ontological status of propositions independent of propositional acts is a compound inquiry which can be stated as "If they do exist, do they exist independently of the mind as do the objects of various objectivisms, or do they come into being when an object becomes the intended object of a mental act?" The answer to this question is not, however, essential to the fundamental criticism of independent propositions as the objective constituents of our propositional acts, i.e. the truth. Whether independent propositions exist as do the objects of objectivism, or as the timeless truths concerning an object once it has become the intended object of a mental act, their reason for being would appear to be essential only to the process of discovery. The fundamental criticism then becomes one that is similar to the criticisms levied against, for example, historical objectivity. "What is the basis for our selection of inquiries and methodologies, and is the selection tainted by considerations that can be considered as value-impregnated?" For example, if the intended objects of mental acts is a selective process guided by simply what is useful, then objectivity is based upon pragmatics, or perhaps some form of relativism, and should be considered as depicting propositional attitudes where the existence of propositions is dependent upon those attitudes.

Taking an objective approach may not always be relevant, particularly in cases where it is impossible to be objective either because the relevant facts and viewpoints necessary are lacking, or because it is the subjective opinion or response that happens to be important. Thus it is possible to take an objective approach appropriately in situations which call for an expression of subjective thought or feeling. In this the problematic relation of truth to objectivity becomes evident, for example, the statement "I am cold" may be considered by some philosophers as the expression of a subjective state, but unless the expression is an intent to deceive, it must be considered a true statement. If it is true, then is it also objective?

Conclusion

Objectivity is then the act of, or propensity for being objective, and is not the objective itself. The possibility of a complete objectivity has been often debated, in particular in the fields of history, journalism and epistemology (see also philosophy of science). It has been considered as the result of a specific historical method or scientific method, or even, as in the classic marxist conception, as the result of social interactions. In this sense, the discourse's objectivity is the result of social interactions, and the scientific discourse can't be disassociated from the social context.

Jürgen Habermas, to the contrary, believed in a dialogue which could be isolated from power relations, and finally reach a consensus, considered as the condition of possibility of the discourse itself. He thus thought that objectivity was achieved through a continuous dialogue, which would only lead toward further improvement and accuracy. According to this conception, objectivity requires communication and good faith. Even if one does not accept the existence of independent propositions or timeless truths, this does not exclude the possibility of viable communication or knowledge.

This optimistic view of necessary progress through conversation was criticized by philosophers such as Michel Foucault or Gilles Deleuze, whom solidified an alleged definition of philosophy as "marketing" or as simple "democratic conversation", where everyone would expose his personal point of view.

Objectivism

Objectivism tends to state, as in Platonic idealism, that there is a reality or realm of objects existing independent of the mind. Metaphysical objectivism, opposed to subjectivism (for example, Berkeley's empiricism), thus believes in the existence of an objective reality. Objectivism then is inclusive of objects which we may not know about and are not the intended objects of mental acts. Objectivity requires truth, and the objects themselves are not true or false. Only propositions, or the objective constituents of our propositional acts, are true or false.

The importance of perception in evaluating and understanding objective reality is debated. Realism sides that perception is key in directly observing objective reality, while instrumentalism holds that perception is not necessarily useful in directly observing objective reality, but is useful in interpreting and predicting reality. The concept that encompasses these ideas is important to philosophical foundation of science.

The relationship of probability and objectivism

The significance of probability to objectivism is recognized when attempting to understand situations with unknown underlying truths. For example, it can be supposed that a coin is flipped without looking at it, and then covered with a piece of paper. Objectivism assumes that there is an underlying truth about the state of the coin, regardless of the fact that it cannot be seen by an observer. Probability becomes useful in understanding and realizing possible situations of this unknown part of objective reality.

Endnotes

^ Vernant, Jean-Pierre and Detienne, Marcel, Les ruses de l’intelligence - La mètis des Grecs, Paris, Flammarion, 1974.

External links

Objectivity Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Objectivity (philosophy)

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